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THE PARTNERSHIP FORM IN LITIGATION: A CASE
STUDY
Nelson P. Lovins*
The corporate form of doing business is a creature of twentieth century American law, and its application to close corporations has grown in
popularity during the last fifty years. As a consequence, law schools spend
very little time educating students in partnership jurisprudence, lawyers
feel more comfortable with the corporate form, and a whole generation of
lawyers has less familiarity with partnership law than its predecessors.
This article will examine the law of general partnership in the context of litigation. It will review selected sections of the Uniform Partnership Act and associated case law and discuss their application in litigation
utilizing a hypothetical dispute. Finally, various remedies and techniques
will be discussed that apply not only to partnership litigation, but business
litigation generally.
I. CRASH COURSE FOR THE NOVICE
A. The Nature of the General Partnership
Unlike the corporation and the limited partnership, the general partnership is not an entity, but rather an association of individuals. In Massachusetts, the Uniform Partnership Act can be found in Chapter 108A.'
Section 6 defines the general partnership as "an association of two or more
persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit... ,,2 Indeed, in
. Adjunct Professor Suffolk University Law School and principal in the
law firm of
Lovins & Metcalf, Woburn and Boston, Massachusetts. I wish to thank my associate, Paul
M. Rezendes, for his assistance with the content of footnote 56; my secretary, Jill P. Sasso,
for her help in the typing and formatting of the proof; and the staff of the Suffolk Journalof
Trial &Appellate Advocacy.
1 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 108A, § 1 (2005). The Limited Liability Partnership was
engrafted onto chapter 108A by amending sections 2, 6, 15, 18, 34, 3 and 40 and by adding
sections 45-49 by chapter 281, st. 1995. See generallyMASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 108A (2005).
2 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 108A, § 6 (2005); see also UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS
ASSOCIATIONS, AMERICAN CASEBOOK SERIES 426 (West Group 2002).
A longstanding debate among academicians is whether the partnership is best
conceived of as an aggregate of its individual members or an entity separate and
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Massachusetts the general partnership, with few exceptions, can only sue
and be sued in the name of all the partners. 3 However, Rule 17(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for an entity approach in this
connection. 4 On the other hand, the limited partnership, a hybrid between
the corporation and the general partnership, is considered an entity, and
should be sued in its own name. 5
B. Selected Sections of Chapter108A and Applicable Case Law
1. Partnership Property and a Partner's Property Rights
The existence of a partnership is a matter of intent,6 and a sharing in
the profits of the business is prima facie evidence of a partnership.7 Certainly, no written agreement is necessary. 8
A partner has the right to have the partnership books of account
maintained at the principal place of business and has the right to full information on demand. 9 His rights to an accounting are set out in sections
21, 22 and 43 of chapter 108A.
The law distinguishes between property of the partnership and
property rights of its partners. All property originally brought into the
partnership or subsequently acquired, by purchase or otherwise, on account
of the partnership is partnership property; and property purchased with
partnership funds is partnership property, unless a contrary intention appears. 10 On the other hand, a partner's property rights are the right to possess specific partnership property for partnership purposes, his share of the
profits and surplus and his right to participate in the management of the

distinct from them. At the time when the drafting of the UPA was commenced,
the common law generally reflected the aggregate approach. The first draft of the
of the UPA, prepared by Dean James Barr Ames.... generally favored the entity
approach. However, Dean Ames died and was replaced by William Draper Lewis
who favored the aggregate approach. Lewis persuaded the Commissioners to
change their approach to the aggregate theory ....
Id. The Revised Uniform Partnership Act provides that "a partnership is an entity distinct
from its partners." REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 20 1(a).
3 Shapira v. Budish, 275 Mass. 120, 126-27 (1931).
4 FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b).

5 Fusco v. Rocky Mountain I Invs. Ltd. P'ship, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 441,448 (1997).
6 Cardullo v. Landau, 329 Mass. 5, 8 (1952).
1

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 108A, § 7(4) (2005).

s id. at § 6.
9 Id. at §§ 19, 20.
0 Id. at §§ 8(1), 8(2).
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business.' 1 A partner is a tenant in partnership with his co-partners. He is
neither a tenant in common, nor a joint
12 tenant. The distinctions are well
delineated in the case of Wills v. Wills:
When the English courts in early common law began to discuss the legal incidents of partners in partnership property,
the concepts of joint tenancy and tenants in common were
familiar. But these tenancies were not precisely applicable to
partnerships. The attempt of the courts to escape inequitable
results of applying the legal incidents of these tenancies to
business partnerships produced "very great confusion." The
Uniform Partnership Law therefore ended this confusion by
creating a new type of tenancy - a tenancy in partnership.
Under this tenancy, a partner is a co-owner with his partners
of specific partnership property holding as a tenant in partnership and his interest is his share of the profits and surplus.
...
The interest of the partners in partnership property is sui
generis and is neither that of joint tenants nor of tenants in
common. The partners hold an interest in specific partnership property, not in joint tenancy, but as tenants in partnership. In short, a partner owns no personal specific interest in
any specific property of the partnership; the partnership owns
the property and the partner's interest is an undivided interest
as co-tenant
in all partnership property as a "tenant in part13
nership."'
What this means then is simple: a partner's property rights with regard to the actual partnership property is not ownership in that property
itself, but only a right to possess it for partnership purposes. His interest in
the partnership is his share of the profits and surplus, and that interest is
personal property. 14
2. Dissolution, Wind Up and Termination
The concept of dissolution, wind up and termination often are confused. Dissolution is simply a change in the relationship caused by one of
the partners ceasing to be associated in carrying on the business. 15 Dissolution may be caused by any of the following events: termination of the
" id. at, §§ 24, 25, 26.
12

750 S.W 2d 567 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); see also Shapira v. Budish, 275 Mass. 120,

126-27 (1931).
13 Wills, 750 S.W.2d at 572-73 (internal citations omitted).
14 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 108A, §§ 25(2)(a), 26 (2005).
15 Id. at § 29.
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partnership term; the express will of all the partners, either before or after
any specified term; the express will of any one partner where there is no
definite term (a partnership at-will), or in contravention of the agreement,
where there is a definite term; the expulsion of any partner pursuant to any
power conferred in the agreement; where the continued existence of the
partnership becomes a violation of law; the death or bankruptcy of any
partner; and the decree of a court. 16 Dissolution does not inexorably lead
to termination, as a wind-up period to complete the affairs of the partnership will precede termination and dissolution will not always lead the partnership into a wind-up.17 The rights and obligations of partners inter sese
upon dissolution, wind-up and termination may be found in sections 31
through 38 and 40 and 42 of Massachusetts General Laws chapter 108A.
However, five cases are very instructive: Anastos v. Sable,18 Meehan v.
19 Johnson v. Kennedy, 20 Page v. Page2 1 and Collins v.
Shaughnessy,
22
Lewis.

In Collins, the court underscored the difference in the effect of termination when the partnership is at-will rather than for a term. In either
case, a partner may dissolve at any time. However, when the dissolution is
in contravention of the agreement, the terminating partner will be liable for
any damages flowing from a breach of the contract.
Although, a partnership at-will may be dissolved at any time by any
of the partners with impunity from contract damages, the question here is
whether damages founded on some other theory may be available. This
was the question in both the Page and Johnson cases. In Page, the California court held that although a partner at-will has the unfettered right to
dissolve, the right must be exercised in good faith because partners are
fiduciaries inter sese.24 At first blush, this holding seems to be in direct
conflict with the pronouncement of the Supreme Judicial Court in the
Johnson case. There, one of the partners decided to surreptitiously remove
the partnership assets to a secret location just prior to the time that the
partners were scheduled to sign a long-term partnership agreement.25 The
16 Id. at §§ 31, 32.
17 Id. at § 30; Adams v. United States, 218 F. 3d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 2000); see also

infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text (discussing valuation of a partner's interest when
he dissolves in contravention of the agreement where the remaining partners choose to
continue the business rather than to liquidate).
18 443 Mass. 146 (2004).
19 404 Mass. 419 (1989).

20 350 Mass. 294 (1966).
21 55 Cal. 2d 192 (Cal. 1961).
22 283 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
23 Id.

24 Page, 55 Cal. 2d at 196.
25 Johnson, 350 Mass. at 295-96.

PARTNERSHIP FORM IN LITIGATION
plaintiff claimed the dissolution was wrongful and that he was entitled to
damages. 26
The Johnson court first decided that negotiations for a term agreement did not alter the fact that the partnership was at-will. 27 Accordingly,
the court stated, "in a partnership of indefinite duration, any partner may
dissolve the firm at any time., 28 Citing to chapter 108A, section 38(1) of
the Massachusetts General Laws, the court said that because the termination of an at-will partnership, "however unseemly in manner and
method, 29 was not wrongful, the plaintiff was entitled to his full share.
This rather strict language in Johnson appeared to have choked off any
possible argument based on fiduciary obligations. However, when the
Supreme Judicial Court decided the seminal case of Meehan v. Shaughnessy,3 ° it provided helpful clarification:
The wrongful conduct described in §§ 31 and 38 consists of
dissolving the partnership before its term. We have noted
that the dissolution of a partnership at will, "however unseemly in manner and method, [is] not a legal wrong." This
statement from Johnson recognizes that dissolution of a partnership at will is not "wrongful" or "in contravention of the
agreement" within the meaning of either § 31 or § 38, and is
therefore not a "legal wrong" that would trigger the remedies
of § 38 (2). ... We emphasize that the § 38 (2) remedy is in
addition to, and distinct from, the remedy provided by § 21
for wrongdoing which is not connected with a premature dissolution.The recent case of Anastos v. Sable32 has clarified the rights of partners who dissolve in contravention of a partnership agreement.
In that
case, one of three partners filed a petition to dissolve under section 32 prior
to the term of the agreement and sued for the value of his partnership interest. 34 The other partners counter-claimed for the damages incurred as a
result of the wrongful dissolution.35 The elements of these damages were

27

Id. at 296.
Id. at 298.

28

Id.

26

id.
404 Mass. 419 (Mass. 1989).
31 Meehan, 404 Mass. at 429 n.6; see also Holmes v. Darling, 213 Mass. 303 (1913);
In re Curran, 157 B.R. 500 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993).
32 443 Mass. 146 (2004).
29

30

33

id.

34

Id. at 147.

35 id.
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the subject of a stipulation. 36 Because the remaining partners chose to continue the business as a going concern, the question as to value was whether
it was a one-third liquidation value or a discounted value. 7 The trial judge
found that because the remaining partners wanted to continue and the
plaintiffs interest was a minority interest with restrictions on control, the
value of the
plaintiffs interest was less than one-third of the partnership
38
net assets.
Whether to use a liquidation or going concern method when a partner dissolves in contravention of the agreement and the remaining partners
wish to continue presented a question of first impression on appeal.39 In
these circumstances, the remaining partners may elect to continue. 40 The
plaintiff nevertheless asserts that the liquidation method (net assets value
41
of each share) is proper.
The Supreme Judicial Court said that when a partner dissolves in
contravention of the agreement, the other partners have two options. 42
They may either terminate and recover damages from the wrongdoer or
they may continue, if they wish, and pay the wrongdoer "the value of his
interest in the partnership at the dissolution, less any damages recoverable. '4 3 The court said that under sections 38(2)(a)(I) and (II), had the
remaining partners chosen to terminate, the plaintiff would have been entitled to his net asset value less any damages. 44 However, because the defendants chose to continue the business, the plaintiff's rights were governed by section 38(2)(c)(II). 45 That section excludes good will from the
value of the departing partner's interest and, the court reasoned, were it
intended to apply to partnership assets at liquidation, good will would not
have been mentioned.46 The court concluded that the going concern
method was correct for valuation purposes under the circumstances.47

36 Id. at
17 Id. at
38 id.

148.
147-48.

39Anastos, 443 Mass. at 149.
40 Id.; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 108A, § 38(2)(b) (2005).

41Anastos, 443 Mass. at 149.

Id. at 150.
43 Id. (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 108A, § 38(2)(b)) (emphasis in original); see
42

also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 108A, § 38(2)(a) (2005).
44Anastos, 443 Mass. at 150.
45 id.
46 Id. at 150-52.
41 Id. at 152.

PARTNERSHIP FORM IN LITIGATION

C. The Requisitesfor an Injunction
The judicial attitude toward preliminary injunctive relief has
changed substantially over the last twenty years. Today, it is extremely
rare to obtain ex parte relief; and creative arguments by defendants concerning the absence of irreparable harm, even where there is a likelihood of
success, may nevertheless win the day.
In 1980, the Supreme Judicial Court announced that an injunction
may issue where a plaintiff enjoys a reasonable likelihood of success on
the merits of the case; is suffering and, absent the requested relief, will
continue to suffer irreparable harm; and where the balancing of harms and
public interest favor the issuance of the injunction.4 8 In Massachusetts,
the bedrock for the issuance of an injunction had always been adequacy of
legal remedy. In other words, if the damages remedy were available to a
plaintiff, then a court sitting in equity would not exercise its jurisdiction.
With the adoption of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure in 1975
and the blurring of the lines between law and equity, "adequacy of legal
remedy" began to loose its luster, at least as a catch phrase. Nevertheless,
it is alive and well within the notion of "irreparable harm." In other words,
if a respondent can demonstrate the availability of damages, the plaintiff
may not have a case of irreparable harm and no injunction should issue.
II. THE HYPOTHETICAL CASE
In reading the facts of the case, it is important to remember that
partners owe one another a fiduciary duty inter sese. In the now familiar
case of Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype,49 the Supreme Judicial Court announced that shareholders in a close corporation owe a duty to one another
of utmost good faith and loyalty.5 ° In so deciding, the court said that this
was the same duty owed by partners inter sese.51 Thus, partners do not
owe one another merely a duty of good faith and loyalty, but rather utmost
good faith and loyalty.52
A. The Facts
Jan and David have been partners for nearly twenty years. About
fifteen years ago, they reduced their agreement to writing, making it clear
they were operating as partners under the Massachusetts version of the
48

Packaging Indus. Group v. Cheney, 380 Mass. 609, 617 (1980); see also GTE

Prod. Corp. v. Stewart, 414 Mass. 721, 723 (1993).
49 367 Mass. 578 (1975).
50 Donahue, 367 Mass. at 598.
"' Id. at 587.
52 Id. at 598; see generally Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458 (1928).
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Uniform Partnership Act. About ten years ago, they were lovers for a brief
period. This fact will become an issue in the litigation, albeit a minor one.
Both have married since that time.
The two partners are well known local designers of women's clothing with distinct, but complementing styles. After working together for a
short period, they decided to open a small retail location, where they have
remained until the time of the litigation. From that site, they have designed
and sold their creations. The clothing was produced at various off-site
locations and by various manufacturers based on the designs and patterns
of the partners.
A summary of the provisions of the agreement in corresponding
numbered paragraphs follows below:
1. Establishment of the partnership under the name of Jan and
David Creations.
2. That the partnership has already been in existence for a number
of years.
3. That the partnership shall continue until terminated as herein
provided.
4. Assets were to be divided into three categories - assets purchased by the partnership, each of the partners and jointly by
the partners. The capital accounts would then reflect these values.
5. Net profits were to be shared according to a formula. Certain
designs were done individually and others were done jointly.
After all of the cost of goods and expenses of production were
determined, each partner's profits were determined on a net basis. As a result, the more prolific the partner, the greater the
share of the profits.
6. Salaries and draws were based on the above formula, which
could be reduced by the cost of any employee hired to cover for
any partner absent from the business for more than thirty days.
7. The partners had day-to-day joint management of the business
and had no authority for extraordinary action without the consent of all the partners.
8. The books were to be maintained at the principal office of the
business and each partner was to have access at all times.
9. The partnership could be "terminated and dissolved" (sic) upon
a ninety-day notice prior to the end of any fiscal year to terminate at the end of such year. "Upon termination ... , the affairs

shall be wound up." (sic). The assets would then be liquidated
and the net proceeds distributed in accordance with parties'
capital accounts.
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In January through March of both 2003 and 2004, Jan resided in
Florida with her then fianc6. Despite this time away from the business, she
continued to create designs and remained in contact with both the sales
staff and David. She was charged with the extra salaries paid to the sales
people who substituted for her sales functions.
In early 2004, David began to complain about Jan's absence from
the business. Jan believed this was motivated by David's jealousy over
Jan's fianc6. Because her future plans contemplated winters in Florida, she
offered him extra time off during the summers. But David found this unacceptable. Finally, beginning in May 2004, the two partners began to exchange buy-out proposals, which continued throughout the summer.
A key sticking point in these proposals was the nature of the legal
property in the clothing designed by each designer. David's position was
that he, rather than the partnership, owned the clothing designed by him
and that he ought to be able to remove it to his new planned location. Jan's
view was that, regardless of who designed the clothing, all of it was a partnership asset and, absent an agreement, it all should be liquidated at auction or a going-out-of-business sale, with the proceeds distributed thereafter in accordance with the capital accounts formula in section 9 of the
agreement.
In July 2004, David notified Jan of his intent to dissolve, effective
on December 31. However, because he became completely frustrated with
his inability to strike a deal with Jan during the summer, he removed all
"his" inventory without notice and after hours on the Friday evening before
Labor Day. Jan immediately filed her action, seeking an injunction and
damages. Among other things, she asked for an immediate return of the
inventory to the business location of the partnership, asserting that it
needed to be liquidated (preferably at a going-out-of-business sale, which
she claimed would bring the highest value) with the proceeds applied in
accordance with the agreement, and a prohibition against the removal of
any additional inventory. David responded by claiming that Jan failed to
show irreparable harm and was, therefore, not entitled to an injunction.
B. The Analysis
Although the partnership was reduced to a signed agreement, the
agreement did not contain any definite term for its existence. Indeed, it
included a mechanism for dissolution and termination, albeit inartfully
drafted. Furthermore, David can argue that under Johnson v. Kennedy
removal of the partnership assets 53 to another location is not wrongful
53 Apparently, in anticipation of an argument that he has acted wrongfully, he claims

he has the right to remove "his" creations based on that part of the agreement that sets
draws and profits based on a production formula. This argument is not likely to prevail as it
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("however unseemly in manner and method"), because of the at-will nature
of the partnership agreement. Jan, on the other hand, may ague that even if
this is an at-will partnership, dissolution by any means other than that articulated in the agreement is wrongful. In other words, had no mechanism
existed, David's actions may well have come within the protections of the
Johnson case. But, David breached an agreement containing a specific
term. Simply stated, the method and timing for dissolution and liquidation
were specifically provided for.
Has David dissolved in contravention of the agreement where no
term was provided, but where he failed to follow the mandated mechanism? If he has acted in contravention of the agreement, then Jan may be
entitled to damages for breach of the agreement. On the other hand, if the
dissolution did not violate the agreement, then Jan may nevertheless be
entitled to damages under section 21 of Massachusetts General Laws chapter 108A (assuming David profits from the assets he removed and they are
found to be partnership assets) even if contract damages are not available.
David's claim that he has not acted wrongfully because the inventory he removed is "his inventory" is unlikely to prevail, 54 because property acquired on account of the partnership is partnership property under
section 8(1) and he has the right to possess partnership property only for
partnership purposes. 55 If this is correct, then David has converted partnership property; however, because damages should be available for conversion, this notion may interfere with the issuance of an injunction. On the
other hand, if Jan can persuade the court that the liquidation of all, rather
than part, of the property (at an auction or going-out-of-business sale)
would bring greater proceeds, but that the damages are not calculable, she
may obtain the injunction. Additionally, Jan may argue that paragraph 9 of
the agreement contemplates an orderly liquidation that she is being
56 denied
and that this loss is also not susceptible of a damage calculation. In any
is clear the partners were working for the partnership and creating partnership assets.
54 See supra note 53.
55 MASS. GEN. LAWS

ch. 108A, § 25(2)(a) (2005). A partner's interest in the partner-

ship is his share of the profits and surplus. Id. at § 26.
56 "Injunctive relief is appropriate when damages are difficult to measure."

A.W.

Chesterton, Inc. v. Chesterton, 907 F. Supp. 19, 23 (D. Ma. 1995). See also New Boston
Sys., Inc. v. Joffe, No. 93-6343 1993 Mass. Super. LEXIS 108 Mass. (Nov. 28, 1993)
(Volterra, J.) (commenting that "[Diamages would be much more difficult to calculate and
therefore present the type of irreparable harm ideally suited to a preliminary injunction.").
The rule of law in Chesterton is amply supported by other precedent as well. For instance,
in Davis v. New England Railway Publishing Company, 203 Mass. 470 (1909), plaintiff
complained he was omitted from a directory purporting to list all reputable express delivery
companies in the Boston area. Id. at 477. By being left out of the directory, the plaintiff
said, the impression was created that he simply did not exist with the result that business
was diverted away from him. Id. at 478. The Supreme Judicial Court overruled a demurrer
saying, "It is peculiarly a case for equitable relief.... The extent of the injury cannot be
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event, a court should issue an order prohibiting the removal of any further
property. If Jan is unsuccessful in obtaining an order for the return of the
property, she may want to consider asking for the appointment of a receiver to take possession of all the partnership property to liquidate the
same. This should accomplish her purposes without an injunction, as the
receiver will take possession of all partnership assets and liquidate the
same. Finally, if David has removed the books and records, an injunction
should be available ordering their return, as the books and records are to be
maintained at the principal office, accessible at all times and all the partners have equal rights in the management
of the business both as a matter
57
of law and under the agreement.
58
On the question of the issuance of an injunction, irreparable harm
and likelihood of success have been discussed above. The court will next
need to balance the risk of irreparable harm to the plaintiff, if the injunction does not issue, against any potential irreparable harm to the defendant

measured accurately in an attempt to assess damages." Id. at 478-79. See also Hull Mun.
Lighting Plant v. Massachusetts Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 399 Mass. 640 (1987) (stating
damages inadequate where injury to plaintiff threatens the very existence of the business);
Allied Mktg. Group Inc. v. CDL Mktg. Inc., 878 F.2d 806, 810 (5th Cir 1989); Union Nat'l
Life Ins. Co. v. Tillman, 143 F. Supp. 2d 638 (N.D. Miss. 2000); Eutectic Welding Alloys
Corp. v. Zeisel, 11 F.R.D. 78, 80 (D.N.J. 1950) (holding failure of ongoing business irreparable harm).
Non-competition agreements to protect good will are enforced on this basis. As the
Supreme Judicial Court has explained:
The policy of the law is that business men should keep their contracts, and not
turn the contractee over to the uncertain remedy of an action at law for damages
for non-performance." ... The basis of the equitable relief is that the damages suffered or to be suffered are irreparable, or that an action at law would not afford
adequate damage. ... Applying the rule to the facts shown by the report, it is plain
the exercise of the defendant's business by him alone or in association with others
in the City of Boston would probably interfere with the tendency, from habit, of
customers to resort to the plaintiff to obtain the services which he furnished and
they were accustomed to receive at his office; ... and the damages which he
would be able to prove would be inadequate, and unsubstantial,for the reason
that the basisfor the computation would be too speculative, conjectural or uncertain.
Edgecomb v. Edmonston, 257 Mass. 12, 18-19 (1926) (quoting Feigenspan v. Nizolek, 65
A. 703, 707 (1907)) (citations omitted, emphasis added); see also Lufkin's Real Estate, Inc.
v. Aseph, 349 Mass. 343, 346 (1962) (commenting "It is the practical difficulty of establishing monetary damages which is the basis for the equitable relief afforded by the specific
enforcement of this type of contract") (quoting from Snelling & Snelling of Massachusetts,
Inc. v. Wall, 345 Mass. 634, 635 (1963)).
57 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 108A, §§ 19, 24 (2005); see supra paragraphs 7 and 8 of the
partnership agreement between Jan and David.
58 See Packaging Indus. Group v. Cheney, 380 Mass. 609, 617 (1980) (concluding
irreparable harm is that harm that cannot be vindicated on final judgment).
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by the entry of the requested relief.59 Finally, the plaintiff here should argue that the public has an interest in seeing that contracts are enforced.
III. SOME TECHNIQUES AND REMEDIES TO BE CONSIDERED IN
BUSINESS LITIGATION GENERALLY
A. Injunctive Relief
The injunction is a powerful and frequently used tool in business
litigation and the litigator will need to be familiar with Packaging Industries v. Cheney6° and its progeny as well as Rule 65 under the Massachusetts and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 61 One element of Rule 65 frequently overlooked, especially in Massachusetts courts, is the requirement
of security. The rule mandates that no injunction "shall issue except upon
the giving of security by the applicant ...
for the payment of such costs and
damages as may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to have
been wrongfully enjoined or restrained. 62 Although the Massachusetts
rule allows for this requirement to be waived upon the showing of "good
cause," respondents infrequently raise the issue and the courts rarely consider the matter voluntarily. If an injunction does issue and the court has
failed to require the posting of security (a requirement under Rule 65),
respondent's counsel should ask the court to order it. There are those cases
where the respondent's inability or refusal to post the security will cause
the injunction to fail, even in the face of a legitimate basis for its issuance.
B. Reach andApply
There are two types of bills to reach and apply - the traditional nonstatutory bill and the statutory remedy provided by chapter 214, section 3
of the Massachusetts General Laws. 63 The former is available after judgment when the execution is returned unsatisfied, although no judgment is
necessary where the debtor is insolvent. 64 The statutory bill is "in the nature of an equitable trustee process" and can be used to restrain the transfer
'9

Id. at 617-18.

60 380 Mass. 609 (1980).
61

The business litigator also should be familiar with MASS. GEN.

LAWS

ch. 231 §

118, par. 1., which provides for emergency relief in the Appeals Court (single justice) from
the granting or denying of an injunction. See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292(a)(1) and (b) (2005).
62 FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c); MASS. R. Civ. P. 65(c).
63 See generally In re Rare Coin Galleries of Am.,

Inc. v. Vinick & Young, 862 F.2d

896 (1st Cir. 1988).
64 Wax v. Monks, 327 Mass. 1, 3 (1951); First Nat'l Bank v. Nichols, 294 Mass. 173,
182-83 (1936).
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of intangible or equitable property in the hands of the debtor or some third
party and then, post judgment, to reach and apply the property in satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim. 65 Strictly speaking, however, it is not the
statutory action for a reach and apply that creates the equitable lien, but
rather the granting of the injunction. 66 As such, the applicant for an injunction will be obligated67to demonstrate the four requirements mandated by
PackagingIndustries.
The remedy provided by Massachusetts General Laws chapter 214,
section 3(6) is a statutory action whose elements will need to be supported
for a plaintiff to prevail on a claim of likelihood of success. The statute
requires that there be a "debt" and that the property sought to be restrained
must be "unavailable for ordinary attachment or levy."6 8 Essentially, a
"debt" is a claim for damages, which, although unliquidated, is cable of
being ascertained by mathematical calculation.69 Under this section, a
partner may be restrained from withdrawing any portion of his interest in
the surplus and profits in his partnership and the same may be reached and
applied in satisfaction of a debt; and where a judgment has issued, the
business of the partnership may even be enjoined or interrupted. 70 Accordingly, in the hypothetical case above, if the court declines to order the return of the property on the theory that damages are available for the defendant's conversion,7 1 the plaintiff should seek a statutory reach and apply
against defendant's interest in the partnership to the value of the converted
goods.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the general partnership has somewhat fallen out of favor
over the last fifty years, there still exist many good reasons for its use in a
business context. For example, unlike the new LLC, 72 the general partnership has developed a very mature body of jurisprudence that lends a certain
65 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Abbott, 127 Mass. 558, 560 (1879); see also MASS GEN.

LAWS

ch. 214, § 3(6) (2005); Michael C. Gilleran, Massachusetts PrejudgmentSecurity Devices:
Attachment, Trustee Process,and Reach and Apply, 69 MASS. L. REV. 156, 169 (1984).
66 In re Osgood, 203 B.R. 865 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997); In re Borofsky, 138 B.R. 345
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1992). The reach and apply vehicle should also be available in federal
cases. See FED. R. Civ. P. 64.
67 380 Mass. 609 (1980).
68 In re Rare Coin Galleries, 862 F.2d at 904.
69 Garsson v. Am. Diesel Engine Corp., 310 Mass. 618, 621 (1942).
70 See also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 108A, § 28 (2005).
71 Plaintiff should also consider an application under section 1 of Massachusetts
General Laws chapter 214, which provides for equitable replevin. Arguably, the fact that
damages may be available for the conversion should not defeat plaintiffs request for a
return of the property, if her application is made on behalf of the partnership.
72

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156C (2005).
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sense of comfort to practitioners. There are no filings or franchise fees
required of a general partnership as with the corporation, LLC and limited
partnership; or for that matter any required record keeping or statutory
maintenance, unless mandated by the partnership agreement. Indeed there
is no requirement of a formal agreement. Of course, in the absence of such
an agreement, the statute will govern the parties' rights and obligations.
Finally, if lack of formality and direct participation in management is important to the participants, the general partnership is well suited to the real
estate investment. Tax benefits flow directly through to the partners. It is
true that the same pertains to the sub-s corporation, the LLC and the limited partnership; however, each of those vehicles carries with it one or
more of the impediments referenced above.
While the general partnership is clearly not appropriate in all situations (no one business form is), the partnership should be considered for its
ease of use in the right circumstances. It can be a low-maintenance vehicle; and for those concerned about tort liability, the responsible business
person is likely to purchase adequate insurance in any event.

